Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis

Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior – often resulting in lower levels of pollution – little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the effect of two sources of pollution – only one of which is subject to information disclosure. This paper was prepared while V. Santhakumar was a Visiting Scholar at the Vanderbilt Center for Environmental Management Studies, Vanderbilt University.     

Estimating exchange rate dynamics with diffusion processes: an application to Greek EMU data

Recently various exchange rate models capturing the dynamics during the transition from an exchange rate arrangement of floating rates into a currency union have been derived. Technically, these stochastic equilibrium models are diffusion processes which have to be estimated by discretely sampled observations. Using daily exchange rate data prior to the Greek EMU-entrance on 1 January 2001, we develop a rigorous estimation procedure. Our estimates point to an increasing interventionist economic policy in the run-up to the Greek EMU entrance. A comparison of this econometric indication with policy information provided (ex-post) by the Bank of Greece (BoG) in its Annual Report 2000 reveals that the BoG indeed pursued such an active policy stance (so-called institutional frontloading strategies).      

Negligent hiring: Reducing the risk

In recent years, the responsibility of employers to hire people who are not dangerous or violent has been heightened by the tort, negligent hiring. The courts have ruled that certain employers owe a special duty to employees and third parties (e.g., customers or clients) to protect them from the harmful or criminal acts of other employees. This article contrasts negligent hiring to respondent superior and negligent entrustment, describes the components of negligent hiring, and reviews important legal cases. The article also discusses how employers can minimize the risk of negligent hiring through prudent human resource practices.     

Export Composition and Manufacturing Employment in the US during the Economic Downturn of 1991-92

This paper examines the effect that export composition had upon manufacturing employment in the US during the 1991 recession. Although it takes, on average, approximately $66 000 in exports to create one job, the exact gains in terms of total employment depend upon the labour-intensity of the products being exported. Foreign sales by the chemical and textile industries result in a far greater increase in employment than exports by the petroleum refining or steel industries. This analysis estimates the employment effects of manufacturing exports over the 1989-95 period, utilizing an input-output model to capture both direct and indirect effects. The results demonstrate that export composition has, at times, both strengthened and reduced demand for labour. Consequently, if job-creation is a national goal, it may be in the interests of the US to promote exports from sectors that are labour-using.     

Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner.     

Corporate financial structure and the funding of private pension plans

One strand of the literature on the employment contract focuses on the role of the contract in the efficient sharing of risk between capitalists and workers. One way capitalists can shift risk to workers is to provide part of workers' remuneration in the form of an unfunded, deferred pension. Since bonds, in the event of bankruptcy or voluntary termination, are typically senior to unfunded pension liabilities, capitalists can also affect their risk by altering the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. These observations suggest that corporate financial structure and the employment contract are interdependent. The paper has two major goals. The first is to take a step towards integrating the theory of corporate financial structure with that of the employment contract. The second is to investigate possible consequences of legislation which regulates the funding of private pensions.     

Regulated firms in pollution permit markets with banking

This paper examines a competitive intertemporal market for bankable emission permits, such as sulfur dioxide allowances. Without profit regulation, firms are willing to bank permits if permit prices rise over time with the rate of interest, but will not bank if prices rise more slowly.The market achieves aggregate emission targets at least total cost if there is no profit regulation, but may not do so if firms are subject to profit regulation. Firms must arbitrage differences both in abatement cost and in the regulatory treatment of permits to achieve least total cost.The impetus for this work came from research we initiated during the Summer of 1990 for the Energy Information Agency. We would like to thank Chuck Howe for his detailed comments and enthusiasm, and Jim Alm, Dave Bjornstad, Charles deBartolome, Mike Greenwood, Robert Hahn, Douglas Hale, Carolyn Lang, Jim Markusen, Edward Morey, Till Requate, and Tom Tietenberg. We are grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for stressing the importance of regulation in these markets and for their helpful and clarifying advice.     

Adoption of improved irrigation and drainage reduction technologies under limiting environmental conditions

Modern irrigation technologies have been suggested as a means of conserving scarce water and reducing environmental pollution caused by irrigated agriculture. This paper applies an economic model of technology selection that provides a general framework to analyzing adoption of irrigation technologies under various environmental conditions. Data from the San Joaquin Valley of California is used to verify the theoretical relationships. Results suggest key variables to be considered by policy makers concerned with adoption of modern irrigation technologies. Among these variables are crop prices, water technology costs, farm organization characteristics, and the environmental conditions of the farm or the field. Policy implications were discussed and analyzed.This research was conducted while the first author was a visiting scholar with the Dept. of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis, and USDA-ERS, USA.